

Estimating the Regulatory Costs for U.S. GSIBs



July 31, 2014

Executive Summary

Context

- “Our goal has been to establish regulations ... that aim to offset any remaining too-big-to-fail subsidies these [GSIBs] firms may enjoy.” Gov. Tarullo, Feb. 6, 2014.
- This study includes US-based GSIBs with more than \$500B in assets (JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Citi, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley).
- We analyze the annual cost of compliance with: (1) GSIB capital surcharge, (2) enhanced supplemental leverage ratio, (3) liquidity coverage ratio, (4) net stable funding ratio, (5) possible future rule on long-term debt, and (6) Tester amendment.
- We exclude offsets that are hard to quantify, e.g., CCAR.
 - thus underestimating the overall costs of compliance.


Key Findings

- The total impact of the analyzed policies is between **\$27B and \$45B** in annual costs.
- We report a range and not a single estimate, reflecting:
 - uncertainty in the final form of regulation and
 - methodological assumptions.



Summary of Results (1/3)

Estimated range of compliance costs by regulation (billions of USD)

Lower bound of estimated costs



Upper bound of estimated costs



Summary of Results (2/3)

1 GSIB capital surcharge

Description of regulation	Estimation methodology	Lower bound	Upper bound
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GSIBs must hold an additional 100-250 bps of CET1 as a percentage of RWA above Basel III minimum ratios. 	Additional common equity	[\$114B x (11.1%-3.0%) = \$9.2B]	[\$114B x (11.1%-3.0%) = \$9.2B]
	x Equity premium over cost of debt funding	-	-
	-	[\$763B x 0.21% = \$1.6B]	[\$763B x 0.17% = \$1.3B]
	Reduction in cost of equity due to deleveraging	= \$7.6B	= \$7.9B

Note: Additional capital required above minimum requirements to meet G-SIB surcharge is based on 1Q 2014 Basel III RWAs.

2 Enhanced supplementary leverage ratio

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> US-based GSIBs must hold a supplementary leverage ratio of 200-300 bps above the minimum Basel III leverage ratio. 	Additional common equity	[\$176B x (10.89%- 3.0%) = \$13.9B]	[\$176B x (10.93%-3.0%) = \$14.0B]
	x Equity premium over cost of debt funding	-	-
	-	[\$938B x 0.40% = \$3.8B]	[\$938B x 0.21% = \$2.0B]
	Reduction in cost of equity due to deleveraging	= \$10.1B	= \$12.0B

Note: Additional equity required to meet SLR, estimated 09/2013 TCH study.

3 Liquidity coverage ratio

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All US advanced-approach banking organizations must hold an LCR equal to 100% of 30-day net cash outflows in high quality liquid assets (HQLA). 	Additional HQLA	\$660B	\$1,440B
	x	x	x
	GSIB share of added HQLA	44%	44%
	x	x	x
	Negative carry on HQLA plus opportunity cost of HQLA	(48 bps + 65 bps) = \$3.3B	(48 bps + 65 bps) = \$7.2B

Note: Liquidity shortfall as of 4Q 2010, taken from 12/2012 TCH study. 44% represent the GSIB share of U.S. deposits. 48 bps represents average negative carry on HQLA. 65 bps represents opportunity cost of holding liquid assets, estimates as option-adjusted spread of AA corporate bonds over Treasuries, as of July 2014.

Summary of Results (3/3)

	<u>Description of regulation</u>	<u>Estimation methodology</u>	<u>Lower bound</u>	<u>Upper bound</u>
4 Net stable funding ratio	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Each bank required to maintain available stable funding (ASF) that exceeds its required stable funding (RSF). 	Shortfall in available stable funding	(\$290B)	(\$1,600B)
		x	x	x
		GSIB share of the shortfall	54%	54%
		-	-	-
		Capital raised from other rules replacing 10yr wholesale debt	\$28.9B)	\$28.9B)
		x	x	x
		x	147 bps	147 bps
	(Cost of long-term funding – cost of short-term funding)	=	=	
		\$1.9B	\$12.3B	

5 Possible future rule on long-term debt	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GSIBs required to hold additional loss absorbency at the BHC level. 	Additional loss absorbency required (in \$ billions)	\$104B	\$195B
		x	x (1.85% - 0.38%)	x (1.85% - 0.38%)
			=	=
		Additional funding cost per dollar of loss absorbency	\$1.5B	\$2.9B

6 Tester amendment to Dodd Frank	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FDIC revised assessment formula. Introduction of scorecards (CAMEL ratings and the ratio of higher risk assets to Tier 1 capital). 	Increase in FDIC assessment of member banks	\$3B	\$3B
		x	x	x
		x	93%	93%
		GSIB share of member banks	=	=
		\$2.8B	\$2.8B	

Source: Federal Register/ Vol. 77, No. 211, October 2012.