Scams have escalated into a global, industrial-scale threat, driven by transnational criminal networks that exploit telecommunications systems and online platforms. The United States now faces more than $12.5 billion in reported annual fraud losses, and actual losses are likely far higher when accounting for unreported scams.[1] However, the U.S. remains one of the few major economies without a coordinated national response. Other jurisdictions have begun tackling this crisis with meaningful, system-wide reforms. This paper examines two of the most mature national approaches—those of the United Kingdom and Australia—to draw lessons for the U.S. anti-scam response.
Although the UK and Australia share the common objective of reducing scam losses and strengthening consumer protection, their strategies differ in important ways. The UK has prioritized consumer redress, mandating broad reimbursement for authorized push payment (APP) scams, and expanding real-time payment controls. Australia, by contrast, has pursued a prevention-first model. Its National Anti-Scam Centre (NASC) and 2025 Scams Prevention Framework (SPF) impose clear legal duties on banks, telecoms, and digital platforms, backed by enforceable obligations, coordinated disruption campaigns and real-time intelligence-sharing loops.
Several insights emerge from comparing the two models:
- Prevention must be the organizing principle. The most impactful reforms in both countries are those that stop scams before money moves—such as real-time interdiction, identity and payment verification tools, scam-signal sharing and coordinated disruption of criminal infrastructure. Programs that focus on upstream controls, early detection and cross-sector intervention are more effective than reactive or post-incident measures.
- Cross-sector accountability is critical. Criminals exploit telecoms, search engines, social media and messaging apps long before the scam victim’s bank becomes involved. Australia’s framework directly regulates these platforms to mitigate scams. Both approaches demonstrate that financial institutions alone cannot meaningfully curb scam losses.
- Strong national leadership drives outcomes. Dedicated government coordination—through the UK’s centralized fraud strategy and Australia’s NASC—creates structure, accelerates sector compliance and drives operational consistency that fragmented or voluntary industry-only efforts cannot achieve.
- Real-time data sharing is essential but still maturing. Both countries are building mechanisms to exchange intelligence across banks, telecoms and tech platforms. Progress remains uneven, but early pilots show real promise in preventing scams before funds move.
As U.S. policymakers explore responses to the scam threat, the UK and Australian experiences offer a set of lessons: prioritize prevention, establish mandatory responsibilities for all affected sectors, create national coordination and real-time intelligence loops and align incentives toward early detection. The U.S. landscape—with multiple payment rails, thousands of financial institutions, a broader mix of payment products and overlapping regulatory jurisdictions across federal and state agencies—is far more complex than that of the UK and Australia, but the core lessons from the UK and Australia models still apply. Scams are a whole-of-system problem, and only a whole-of-system solution will meaningfully reduce harm at scale.
I. Introduction
Financial scams cut across borders and platforms. The expansion of digital banking and instant payments has combined with ever more sophisticated social engineering ploys to create a perfect environment for fraud. Global losses passed the $1 trillion mark in 2024—a figure that spans investment hoaxes, romance swindles, phishing campaigns and impersonation schemes, and shows how urgent a coordinated response has become.[2]
Banks have improved their defenses by enhancing multifactor authentication, leveraging behavioral analytics and using real-time transaction screening, among other strategies. However, criminals have shifted their attention to customers. Armed with personal data harvested from breaches and commoditized on the dark web, fraudsters pose as trusted institutions, relatives or friends and coax victims into sending money themselves.
The problem starts long before money moves. Fraud rings use telecommunications networks and social media platforms to blast out millions of messages, set up bogus ads and automate every step of the con. With billions of potential victims scrolling on phones each day, criminals gain low-cost, high-reach access to potential victims. Caller-ID spoofing, phony texts, fake profiles and deep-fake audio help them bypass technical filters and prey on human trust.
Many of these fraud rings are industrial in scale. Syndicates operating from call-center “farms” in Southeast Asia employ hundreds of thousands of people, many of whom are themselves victims of scams and human trafficking, who follow AI-generated scripts and target victims with pinpoint accuracy. After the money is snatched, it flows through cryptocurrency mixers, mule accounts and shell companies that make tracing and recovery difficult, especially given the speed at which it moves overseas.[3]
The numbers tell the story. Fraud losses in the UK were £1.1 billion in 2024, with APP fraud accounting for £451 million (US $596 million).[4] In Australia, reported scam losses topped AUD $2 billion (U.S. $1.3 billion) the same year. Regulators in those markets say the true toll is far higher because many people never report the incident.[5] In the United States, reported fraud losses exceeded $12 billion in 2024, with the FTC estimating the actual losses inclusive of unreported activity exceeding $159 billion.[6]
As financial losses mount and links to transnational organized crime become clearer, governments and regulators face increasing pressure to intervene. This paper examines how the UK and Australia have approached scam prevention, highlighting their regulatory strategies, sector responsibilities and operational models. It focuses on five key areas:
- National Scam Center / Government Coordination: National case collection, including the UK’s fraud strategy and Australia’s NASC.
- Consumer Education: Public campaigns and awareness initiatives to build scam resistance.
- Banking Sector and Regulator Actions: Regulatory mandates, reimbursement rules and fraud controls led by financial institutions.
- Telecom, Social Media and Tech Accountability: Measures to hold communications and digital platforms responsible for scam-enabling activity.
- Data Sharing: Frameworks for cross-sector intelligence sharing to enable real-time detection and disruption.
By reviewing the UK’s reimbursement-focused model and Australia’s prevention-first approach, this paper identifies effective practices and critical gaps, offering guidance for policymakers and industry leaders seeking to reduce scam losses at scale.
II. United Kingdom
Financial scams in the UK remain a pervasive threat, as fraudsters capitalize on both technological innovations and gaps in consumer awareness. APP scams are a prominent concern.
As an early adopter of faster payments, the UK has a long history of grappling with scams, particularly those in which victims themselves authorize fraudulent transactions (e.g., APP). The country’s regulatory framework has evolved through a mix of market-driven initiatives and legislative mandates designed to offer both immediate remedies for consumers and clear responsibilities for financial institutions, telecoms and digital platforms.
There are three regulatory bodies relevant for this review:
- Financial Conduct Authority (FCA): Oversees consumer protection and financial market integrity. The FCA regularly reviews firms’ fraud controls and holds senior management accountable for ongoing oversight.
- Payment Systems Regulator (PSR): Ensures secure and competitive payment systems. Its responsibilities may soon be consolidated under the FCA to streamline oversight.
- Office of Communications: Regulates the UK’s communications industries, including telecoms, broadband and broadcast services.
A. National Scam Center / Government Coordination
The UK’s focus on tracking scams and publishing clear performance metrics has underpinned several impactful interventions. A law called the Banking Protocol requires banks to train frontline staff to spot signs that a customer may be under pressure or being defrauded. Staff must ask appropriate questions, intervene if necessary, and, where suspicion remains, call a dedicated police line so officers can attend the branch and protect the customer.
The law provides a structured process to ensure potential scam victims are identified and safeguarded before money leaves their account. It allows staff to reach a dedicated 999 line the moment they suspect a customer is being coerced. It effectively serves as a national scam reporting center, enabling real-time police intervention at the point of transaction.
Since 2018, the Banking Protocol has reportedly prevented nearly £374 million in losses, triggered over 68,000 police call-outs and led to 1,521 arrests.[7]
B. Consumer Education
Consumer education efforts have expanded on two major fronts. In 2017, UK Finance[8] and the Home Office[9] launched the “Take Five to Stop Fraud” campaign, encouraging consumers to “stop, challenge, and protect” before making payments.[10] By 2023, over 80 percent of UK adults recognized the message.[11] Separately, the government’s 2023 Fraud Strategy launched a nationwide media campaign and introduced scam awareness into school curriculums. Over 430 schools adopted anti-money mule education modules, improving awareness of fraud tactics and reducing the share of victims who failed to recognize scams.[12]
C. Banking Sector and Regulator Actions
In 2019, the industry introduced the voluntary Contingent Reimbursement Model Code, offering “no-blame” refunds for many APP fraud cases.[13]
The PSR later institute mandatory requirements in October 2024, which require banks to reimburse APP fraud victims within five business days, up to £85,000, unless gross negligence by the victim is proven. The cost is split equally between the sending and receiving banks. Although these mandates spurred additional investments in fraud analytics and operational preparedness,[14] they have not resulted in significant reductions in scams because they do not address the underlying sources of scams.
As these rules went into effect, financial institutions identified the need to be able to delay payments to identify if a customer may be victim of a scam. The UK Treasury agreed that banks must have time to investigate suspicious activity and issued the Payment Services (Amendment) Regulations 2024, which permits banks to delay suspicious transactions for up to 72 hours. While the PSR cannot halt payments directly, it directed Pay.UK, a UK payments servicer, to build this delay mechanism into scheme rules.[15]
Regulators also worked with banks to enhance Confirmation of Payee throughout the industry. Confirmation of Payee is a name-checking service designed to prevent misdirected payments and reduce fraud by verifying the recipient’s account details before a payment is made. Confirmation of Payee started in 2020 with the six largest banking groups. PSR Policy Statement 22/3 and General Direction 5 extended the name-matching duty to roughly 400 additional payment firms, reaching near-ubiquity across Faster Payments and CHAPS by October 2024.[16] The service slashes misdirected transfers and blocks many scam accounts before money leaves the sender’s account.[17]
D. Telecom, Social Media and Tech Accountability
The Online Safety Act 2023 placed large social media and search platforms under the Office of Communication’s oversight, imposing fines of up to 10 percent of global revenue for repeated failures to remove scam content.[18] The Act aims to prevent users from encountering fraudulent material and requires these companies to actively monitor and remove fraudulent content. The legislation followed years of criticism from consumer groups, Members of Parliament and the banking sector, which argued that tech and telecom platforms were profiting from scams while bearing little responsibility for prevention. It also brought the Office of Communication and the FCA into closer collaboration on online fraud.[19]
In response to the Act, 12 major firms, including Meta and Google, signed a voluntary Online Fraud Charter in November 2023 that promises verified advertisers, faster takedowns and regular data feeds to law enforcement.[20] However, a year after the Charter’s launch, research shows that it has not been effective in reducing the presence of scams on online platforms. In December 2024, the PSR published its first report on fraud enabler data, which was entitled “Unmasking how fraudsters target UK consumers in the digital age.”[21] The report found that 54 percent of APP scams originated from three social media platforms.[22] The PSR intends to publish data annually and improve data collection processes starting from Q1 2025. The data will include the frequency of fraudulent activity reported via certain tech firms’ platforms or services, as well as through other providers.
In addition, the Office of Communication has introduced multiple anti-scam measures for telecom providers to implement. Key actions include:
- Blocking Spoofed Calls from Abroad: As of January 2025, telecom providers must block international calls that fake UK landline numbers.[23]
- Enhanced Caller ID Rules: Starting May 2025, providers must block calls with invalid or spoofed caller ID and those on the “Do Not Originate” list.[24]
- Ban on Leasing “Global Titles”: As of April 2025, mobile operators can no longer lease backend numbers often used by criminals to hijack calls and texts.[25]
- Stronger Business Customer Checks: Telecom firms must now verify business customers using official databases to stop scammers from abusing legitimate phone numbers.[26]
In 2024, UK Finance, which represents hundreds of UK financial institutions, launched a new cross-sector collaboration with telecom providers. The “Scam Signal” solution, developed with a telecom industry association called GSMA, enabled financial institutions to receive real-time scam alerts from telecom providers. This innovation enhances the ability to flag and halt suspicious transactions at the point of initiation.[27]
E. Data Sharing
The PSR, Pay.UK and UK Finance are developing a common set of fraud “risk flags” to identify suspicious transfers in flight. Several cross-industry pilots are testing this approach, which aims to disrupt scams before money leaves the system, rather than relying on post-incident recovery.[28] Cifas, the UK’s national fraud prevention service, maintains a shared database of confirmed fraud across banking, telecom and insurance sectors. Moreover, the Proceeds of Crime Act, the Joint Money Laundering Intelligence Taskforce and the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 support data sharing to prevent economic crime.
Technology platforms are also beginning to participate in this effort. Meta is piloting a data feed that shares metadata on scam ads with banks, helping trace fraud campaigns to their source.
While these steps are promising, broader cross-sector data sharing remains hindered by legal and operational barriers. Significant obstacles include privacy concerns under UK GDPR, limited infrastructure for real-time data exchange, and institutional risk aversion. There is currently no comprehensive legal framework in the UK that enables or requires systematic fraud information sharing between banks and other sectors such as telecom or social media platforms. While some voluntary cross-sector efforts exist, they are fragmented and lack the legal clarity, standardized protocols, and incentives necessary for consistent collaboration. As a result, critical intelligence about fraud threats, such as spoofed messages or scam campaigns, often remains siloed, limiting the collective ability to disrupt fraud at scale.
F. Results and Impact to Date
For the reasons described above, the UK anti-scam framework has been ineffective in fully addressing the rise of fraud. For the first half of 2025, UK Finance reports that overall fraud rose by 3% over the prior year to £629.3 million.[29] APP fraud losses rose during that same period by 12%, to £257.5 million, while cases dropped by 8 percent.[30] UK Finance data shows that 66 percent of APP fraud originates from online platforms and 17 percent from telecom channels. While more frequent, online-originated scams tend to involve lower losses per case than telecom-based scams, which result in higher average losses.[31]
Consumer awareness and law enforcement response have improved. Surveys show fewer victims are caught off guard by scams, suggesting that education efforts and protocols like the Banking Protocol are starting to yield results.[32]
III. Australia
In contrast, Australia’s model offers a more effective example than that of the UK because it focuses on scam prevention.
In 2024, the NASC recorded over 494,000 scam reports, totaling AUD $2.03 billion in reported losses, a 29 percent decrease from 2023. While this decline suggests early progress, scam activity remains significantly underreported, underscoring the persistent risk to consumers.[33] The drop also reflects the growing impact of coordinated efforts by government, law enforcement, industry, and civil society to disrupt scam operations.
Investment scams promising high returns with minimal risk accounted for nearly AUD $1.3 billion in losses, followed by romance scams at approximately AUD $250 million. Increasingly sophisticated impersonation and phishing tactics, often involving banks or government impersonation, highlight systemic vulnerabilities across digital and traditional channels. These evolving threats emphasize the need for forward-looking regulatory frameworks that can adapt to emerging fraud vectors.
The Australian government responded to record scam losses in 2022 with a national anti-scam strategy, allocating AUD $58 million in the 2023-24 budget. The NASC launched in July 2023 within the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. The NASC centralizes prevention, public education, data sharing, and enforcement by coordinating government agencies, private industry and community groups.
A. National Scam Center / Government Coordination
The NASC was formed in response to the rapid growth of scams and the significant consumer and economic harm they cause. The NASC serves as the national authority for reporting scams and fraud through its Scamwatch platform, enabling Australians to report incidents, receive guidance and access up-to-date warnings. The NASC serves as a national coordination hub, bringing together government agencies, industry, and law enforcement to share intelligence, run public education campaigns and implement joint disruption initiatives aimed at making Australia a harder environment for scammers to target.
The NASC has upgraded the way Australians report fraud. In mid-2024, it introduced two short online forms that let users flag scam ads or suspicious web addresses in under a minute. Within six months, the new tools generated 2,241 extra incident reports and fed verified URLs to regulators for rapid takedown. More broadly, Scamwatch now shares suspected mule-account data with banks every two hours and phone-scam numbers with eleven telecom carriers each week, creating a feedback loop that did not exist two years ago.[34]
B. Consumer Education
Australia runs national consumer education on scams primarily through the NASC and its Scamwatch platform, which deliver year-round alerts, bulletins and guidance for the public.[35] In early 2025, the Australian government and NASC launched the “Stop. Check. Protect.” initiative as a unified national call-to-action, providing clear steps for consumers such as verifying contact and reporting suspicious information to Scamwatch.
C. Banking Sector and Regulator Actions
Government incentives for banks and the banking response
The SPF, which took effect in February 2025, is the centerpiece of Australia’s anti-scam legislation. The SPF amended the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 to create a legal framework requiring certain businesses to take reasonable steps to prevent, detect, disrupt, respond to and report scams. It empowers the Treasurer of Australia to designate banks, telecoms and digital platforms as regulated entities and sets enforceable duties.[36]
Among other things, the SPF:
- Applies to banks, telecoms and digital platforms (including social media, messaging apps and paid search).
- Establishes six core obligations: governance, prevention, detection, disruption, reporting and response.
- Enables the Minister for the Treasury to establish SPF Codes, which will impose mandatory obligations on Minister-designated sectors (currently planned to be banks, telecommunication service providers and social media platforms but further sectors such as crypto-asset exchanges may be designated in the future).
- Grants civil penalty powers, up to AUD $52 million, triple the benefit gained, or 30 percent of turnover.
- Provides safe harbor for firms that freeze suspected scam payments in good faith.
- Parliament chose not to mandate automatic reimbursement. Compensation is only required when a firm fails to meet its SPF duties. If all parties follow the rules, the consumer bears the loss. Disputes are first handled by the firm and then referred to an external dispute resolution body.[37]
Industry Response: Scam-Safe Accord
The Scam-Safe Accord, launched in November 2023 by the Australian Banking Association and the Customer Owned Banking Association, was not legislation but an industry-led initiative. It arose under strong government and consumer pressure following the launch of the NASC, with ministers signaling that banks, telecoms and platforms would be held more accountable for scam losses. The Accord was also positioned ahead of the government’s Scams Prevention Framework legislation, allowing the banking sector to show proactive leadership and help shape the regulatory debate while avoiding the immediate imposition of prescriptive rules.
By February 2024, all Australian retail banks had signed on. The Accord operates under three principles—Disrupt, Detect, Respond—and includes: [38]
- An AUD $100 million national Confirmation of Payee system to verify recipients before payments.
- Biometric identity verification for new online accounts.
- Payment delays and alerts for high-risk transactions.
- Limits on payments to high-risk destinations, including certain cryptocurrency platforms.
- Integration with the Australian Financial Crimes Exchange and Fraud Reporting Exchange for faster fraud data sharing and recovery.
D. Telecom, Social Media and Tech Accountability
The Australian Government recognized that stopping the growth of fraud and scams required clear accountability across all sectors, not just banks. Under the SPF, telecommunications providers and digital platforms, including social media and online advertising services, are designated as regulated sectors and must take reasonable steps to prevent, detect, disrupt, respond to and report scams. This includes blocking scam calls or texts, verifying advertisers, monitoring for suspicious content or activity, suspending fraudulent accounts or ads and providing simple ways for consumers to report scams.[39] These providers and platforms are also required to share scam intelligence with the NASC, participate in internal and external dispute resolution, and issue compliance statements. This approach ensures that telecoms and social media companies bear explicit responsibility for reducing scam activity on their networks, closing critical gaps that scammers have long exploited.
Some progress is already occurring even in advance of the law. Australian telecoms expanded the “Do Not Originate” list that blocks spoofed bank numbers, and platforms such as Meta and Google committed to accepting financial ads only from entities on the corporate regulator’s register.
E. Data Sharing
Australia now channels intelligence through two hubs. The Australian Financial Crimes Exchange runs an Anti-Scam Intelligence Loop, which began with banks but now includes police and telecoms. The network enables near real-time sharing of mule account details, device data, and IP addresses. The Australian Financial Crimes Exchange also hosts the new Financial Request Exchange, allowing banks to submit fund recovery requests instantly, increasing the chance of freezing stolen funds.
The NASC coordinates cross-sector fusion cells, uniting banks, telcos, and platforms for six-month campaigns focused on a specific scam type. At first, the investment-scam cell diverted 113 calls to known scam numbers and supplied web-takedown data that helped remove 134 rogue sites. A second cell, launched in April 2024, is targeting remote-access scams and will publish metrics in early 2026.[40]
F. Results and Impact to Date
Early signs show progress:
- Investment scam losses fell by nearly 50 percent between Q1 2023 and Q1 2024.
- Overall scam losses reported to Scamwatch declined, even as access to reporting tools expanded.
- Banks report improved real-time interdiction of high-risk payments.[41]
While challenges remain, including compliance burdens for smaller firms, regulators argue that Australia’s model of public alerts, compulsory controls and intelligence-sharing is beginning to shift the advantage away from scammers.[42]
IV. Comparative Insights: United Kingdom and Australia
Sweeping reforms in the UK and Australia share a common goal: reducing the billions lost to fraud each year. However, the two countries have taken different paths to that objective. Both now emphasize stronger public messaging and faster data sharing, but their approaches have otherwise diverged in important ways.
In 2024, the UK’s total fraud losses remained flat, and APP fraud declined by just 2%, despite a rise in scam attempts. However, other scam types surged. For example, according to UK Finance’s 2025 Annual Fraud Report, investment-related fraud losses rose by 34 percent.[43] These results demonstrate that criminals simply adapted their methods rather than stopping their attacks.
Banks reported increased interdiction of fraudulent transactions, suggesting stronger controls and analytics are preventing more losses at the source. The UK has begun to focus more on upstream disruption, including industry pilots aimed at identifying mule accounts earlier in the payment journey.[44] These efforts have assisted in improvements in the fraud and scams fight; however, the overall reduction in scam losses has been modest, underscoring the limitations of liability-focused policies over broader cross-sector enforcement and prevention.
Australia, by contrast, has taken more targeted action. The NASC’s first six-month “fusion cell” on investment scams brought together banks, telecoms and digital platforms to shut down fake ads and fraudulent websites. As a result, reported investment scam losses dropped nearly 50% between Q1 2023 and Q1 2024.[45] The Scams Prevention Framework, enacted in February 2025, now imposes clear legal duties on firms across sectors, with significant penalties for failing to prevent or respond to scams.
Early results suggest that clear accountability, real-time collaboration and centralized oversight can meaningfully reduce certain types of scams. The long-term impact will depend on how effectively regulators evolve their frameworks, how quickly firms adapt and whether intelligence can be shared across jurisdictions that scammers exploit.[46]
V. Important Takeaways from the UK and Australia
Scams continue to rise at an alarming pace in the United States, exploiting weaknesses across key sectors that can take action early on to help prevent the activity. While U.S. banks have taken important steps to protect consumers, responses from other sectors remain inconsistent, and federal coordination has not kept pace with the scale and sophistication of the threat.
The experiences of the UK and Australia offer valuable lessons for policymakers and industry leaders. Though each country tailored its approach to its unique legal and market environments, several common themes emerge that can guide a more effective U.S. response. These takeaways are organized around five core success factors.
A. Strong Government Leadership is Essential
Both the UK and Australia show that significant reductions in scam losses require clear government leadership, regulatory authority, and structured cross-sector coordination.
- In the UK, the PSR has led a multi-pronged strategy to tackle APP fraud, introducing initiatives like Confirmation of Payee and the Banking Protocol, which integrates law enforcement directly into the response process.
- Australia centralized its efforts under the NASC, which coordinates activity across banks, telcos, platforms, and law enforcement. The SPF, enacted in 2025, imposes legal duties and meaningful penalties for failure to detect or disrupt scams.
Both models underscore that government must not only facilitate collaboration but also set clear expectations, accountability mechanisms and enforcement powers.
B. Proactive Banking Sector Action Drives Impact
Banks in both countries have taken leadership roles in scam prevention by:
- Educating consumers on scam risks and red flags;
- Participating in data-sharing arrangements to alert other institutions of suspected scams; and
- Developing tools like Confirmation of Payee that allow consumers to verify recipient identities before sending funds.
These efforts show that the banking sector is both capable and willing to lead—but systemic progress requires parallel action from other sectors.
C. Intelligence Sharing is Critical, But Still Underdeveloped
Early intervention depends on timely and secure sharing of scam intelligence, yet significant barriers remain:
- Legal uncertainty, fear of liability and lack of cross-sector standards inhibit data sharing.
- Institutions need safe harbors to share information without risking regulatory or legal consequences.
- Collaboration should be formalized and incentivized to facilitate joint detection across banks, telecoms, and tech platforms.
Both the UK’s Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act and Australia’s SPF seek to address these challenges by enabling lawful and efficient data sharing. These frameworks promote a culture of shared responsibility, allowing institutions to act earlier, before victims lose funds.
D. Reimbursement Rules Are Not a Substitute for Cross-Sector Prevention
Reimbursement frameworks address losses after-the-fact, but they do little to reduce scam activity. Experiences abroad show that liability-first models can create new disputes, shift focus away from upstream controls and leave the core scam ecosystem unchanged. The UK’s approach demonstrates that mandating refunds does not meaningfully suppress scam volumes; criminals simply adapt to unregulated channels.
Australia offers a clearer path: liability is tied to whether each sector meets defined prevention duties, not automatic reimbursement. This model reinforces that durable scam reduction depends on shared, enforceable accountability across banks, telecoms and digital platforms, not post-incident compensation.
VI. Conclusion
Scams are rising rapidly in the United States, fueled by sophisticated tactics, faster payments and digital platforms that allow anonymous, large-scale communication. Lessons from the UK and Australia show that fragmented, sector-specific efforts are insufficient. The most effective results come from coordinated national strategies that emphasize early disruption, real-time intelligence sharing and clear accountability across all sectors.
The U.S. landscape, however, is far more complex than that of the UK and Australia. The U.S. has multiple payment rails, thousands of financial institutions, a broader mix of payment products, and overlapping regulatory jurisdictions across federal and state agencies. But while the structure may differ, the core lessons from the UK and Australia models still apply. The U.S. can draw from the most effective components abroad, such as early detection systems, cross-sector obligations and strong central coordination, to shape solutions that fit its own environment.
To truly reduce scam losses and protect consumers, the U.S. must adopt a whole-of-system approach grounded in prevention, shared responsibility and early intervention. The time to act is now, and the roadmap is already visible through global best practices.
[1] https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2025/03/new-ftc-data-show-big-jump-reported-losses-fraud-125-billion-2024.
[2] Global Anti-Scam Alliance, Global State of Scams Report 2024
[3] FATF Report on Money Laundering and Fraud, 2023
[4] Fraud continues to pose a major threat with over £1 billion stolen in 2024 | Insights | UK Finance
[5] Fraud Strategy: Stopping Scams and Protecting the Public. Home Office, Command Paper CP 839, May 2023. HM Stationery Office, Tackling fraud and rebuilding trust
[6] FTC Issues Annual Report to Congress on Agency’s Actions to Protect Older Adults | Federal Trade Commission
[7] UK Finance, Annual Fraud Report 2025
[8] UK Finance is a British trade association for the UK banking and financial services sector. It represents over 300 firms in the UK, providing credit, banking, markets and payment-related services.
[9] The UK Home Office is a government agency responsible for public safety and policing, border security, immigration, passports and civil registration.
[10] UK Finance. “Take Five to Stop Fraud.” Take Five, 2017, https://www.takefive-stopfraud.org.uk/
[11] YouGov Fraud Awareness Poll. Sept. 2023. Home Office. Fraud Strategy: Stopping Scams and Protecting the Public. May 2023, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/64539087faf4aa0012e132cb/Fraud_Strategy_2023.pdf
[12] UK Finance, Annual Fraud Report 2025
[13] Financial Services and Markets Act 2023. Legislation.gov.uk, 29 June 2023, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2023/29/enacted
[14] UK Finance, Annual Fraud Report 2025
[15] HM Treasury. New Powers for Banks to Combat Fraudsters. Gov.uk, 2 Oct. 2024, www.gov.uk/government/news/new-powers-for-banks-to-combat-fraudsters
[16] Payment Systems Regulator. Policy Statement PS22/3: Extending Confirmation of Payee Coverage—Response to Consultation CP22/2. Oct. 2022, www.psr.org.uk/media/migeob4s/ps22-3-extending-cop-coverage-oct-2022.pdf
[17] Payment Systems Regulator. PSR directs 400 firms to introduce the payment protection measure, Confirmation of Payee. Nov. 2022, https://www.psr.org.uk/news-and-updates/latest-news/news/psr-directs-400-firms-to-introduce-the-payment-protection-measure-confirmation-of-payee/
[18] United Kingdom. Online Safety Act 2023. Legislation.gov.uk, 26 Oct. 2023.
[19] FCA highlights Online Safety Act
[20] Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. “Tech Giants Sign Up to UK Online Fraud Charter.” 30 Nov. 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/world-first-agreement-to-tackle-online-fraud
[21] A fraud enabler is defined as a platform or service through which fraudsters contact victims or a website or platform where victims encounter advertisements or profiles that lead to APP scams.
[22] FCA highlights Online Safety Act
[23] Clamping down on scam calls from abroad – Ofcom
[24] Ofcom CLI Changes: regulator tackling spoofing scams – Blog – MEF
[25] Ofcom closes technical loophole used by criminals to intercept mobile calls and texts | Telecoms | The Guardian
[26] Ofcom closes technical loophole used by criminals to intercept mobile calls and texts | Telecoms | The Guardian
[27] Mobile and Banking Industries Join Forces to Fight Fraud – Newsroom
[28] Payment Systems Regulator. Data-Sharing Working Group Progress Update. 12 Feb. 2025.
[29] NASC Targeting Scams Report – March 2025
[30] Over £600 million stolen by fraudsters in first half of 2025 | Insights | UK Finance
[31] Over £600 million stolen by fraudsters in first half of 2025 | Insights | UK Finance
[32] Fraud continues to pose a major threat with over £1 billion stolen in 2024 | Insights | UK Finance
[33] National Anti-Scam Centre. Targeting Scams: Report on Scams Data and Activity 2024. Canberra: ACCC, 11 March 2025
[34] National Anti-Scam Centre, Targeting Scams: Report on Scams Data and Activity 2024, pp. 9–12, 23–24
[35] What we do | National Anti-Scam Centre
[36] Australian Treasury. Scams Prevention Framework Explanatory Memorandum. Feb. 2025
[37] Australian Treasury. Scams Prevention Framework Explanatory Memorandum. Feb. 2025
[38] Banks unite to declare war on scammers – Australian Banking Association
[39] Scams Prevention Framework Bill 2024 – Parliament of Australia
[40] National Anti-Scam Centre, Targeting Scams, pp. 9–10
[41]National Anti-Scam Centre, Targeting Scams, pp. 23–25
[42] Feedzai, Navigating the Australian SPF, Feb. 2025, pp. 27–28
[43] UK Finance, Annual Fraud Report 2025
[44] UK Finance, Fraud—The Facts 2024, Mar. 2024, p. 6
[45] National Anti-Scam Centre, Targeting Scams: Report on Scams Data and Activity 2024, pp. 9–12, 23
[46] UK Finance, Fraud—The Facts 2024; National Anti-Scam Centre, Targeting Scams 2024
