Research Exchange: August 2024

Selected Outside Research

Reallocating Liquidity to Resolve a Crisis

This article develops a blueprint for central bank intervention that would reallocate liquidity among financial institutions to stabilize deposit markets during an incipient bank run crisis. In this framework, a third party “central planner” would allow some banks to issue irrefutable IOUs to other banks at a predetermined amount – contingent upon the issuer’s ability to repay these IOUs – thereby increasing supply within interbank lending, lowering borrowing rates and internalizing this positive externality for increased liquidity. Compared to blanket liquidity injections, such targeted liquidity support can be more effective in addressing specific areas of financial stress, helping to prevent broader market panic by directly addressing the underlying vulnerabilities. Additionally, the article discusses how historically, “an instrument with many of the same features was used by the New York Clearinghouse (NYCH) before the creation of the Federal Reserve”, as a demonstration of “translating these IOUs from theory to practice”.

Reallocating Liquidity to Resolve a Crisis – Liberty Street Economics (newyorkfed.org)

The Treasury – SOFR Swap Spread Puzzle Explained

SOFR-based rates for interest-rate swap contracts have been persistently lower than U.S. Treasury rates and stable, which is puzzling because it would seem to present a potential arbitrage opportunity, given that SOFR is a near-riskless rate. This paper examines these spreads and conducts a comprehensive analysis of the costs, market frictions and regulations that may explain them. Swap spreads based on SOFR are shown to have been persistent and stable during the January 2020 – April 15, 2024, sample period and not correlated with the timing of U.S. Treasury cash flows. The analysis finds that the spreads can be attributed to three factors: bond market frictions as reflected in price quotes, transaction costs and counterparty risks in Treasury repo markets and funding opportunity costs imposed by the Basel III supplementary leverage ratio requirement. We show that “these three factors completely explain swap spreads, with the exception of a few market-wide liquidity crises.” Consistent with previous works, SLR-related funding constraints are found to have the largest impact on swap spreads.

The Treasury -SOFR Swap Spread Puzzle Explained by David Wu, Robert A. Jarrow :: SSRN

Zombie Lending to U.S. Firms

The paper demonstrates that in contrast to experience in other countries, U.S. banks have not engaged in more or cheaper lending to deteriorating “zombie” firms – regardless of the bank’s capital levels or exposure to such firms – setting stricter lending terms to such firms. However, unregulated financial intermediaries, like nonbanks, do provide more and cheaper loans to these struggling firms, to the degree that this activity offsets the decline in bank-originated lending. This conclusion is supported by supervisory data on firm-bank relationships, syndicated lending data and a quasi-experimental setting involving random shocks to firm profitability. Despite the migration of credit origination from banks to nonbanks, the paper finds that zombie firms still face elevated rates of bankruptcy, suggesting that nonbanks’ support does not significantly improve the survival chances of financially distressed firms, even with the firms’ ability to borrow at lower costs.

Zombie Lending to U.S. Firms (atlantafed.org)

Government Litigation Risk and the Decline in Low-Income Mortgage Lending

The paper investigates the consequences of Department of Justice (DOJ) lawsuits in the 2010s against major banks for alleged fraud in the origination of FHA-insured mortgages. The government’s legal actions led to over $5 billion in settlements and prompted large banks and their peers to significantly withdraw from the FHA market. Using difference-in-differences methodologies that exploit geographic variation in exposure to exiting banks, the study finds a 20 percent decline in FHA lending in regions that were heavily reliant on those banks, without a corresponding improvement in loan underwriting standards or default rates. The exodus of large banks has notably restricted mortgage credit access for low-income households.

Government Litigation Risk and the Decline in Low-Income Mortgage Lending (atlantafed.org)

Reciprocal Deposits and the Banking Turmoil of 2023

Reciprocal deposits, which are exchanged between banks to increase effective deposit insurance coverage far in excess of FDIC guarantees, became more prominent during the banking turmoil of 2023. These deposits allow banks to assure their customers that larger portions of their funds are insured, thus reducing the perceived risk of bank runs, as seen during the runs exhibited by Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank and First Republic Bank. The commentary discusses the evolution of reciprocal deposits, including how regulatory changes in 2018 that reclassified reciprocal deposits for insurance purposes made them more attractive, especially to intermediate-sized banks. Also discussed are the legal treatment of reciprocal deposits and their relation to brokered deposits. The analysis suggests that reciprocal deposits are apt to be increasingly utilized in future periods of financial instability, raising questions about broader implications for the deposit insurance system.

Reciprocal Deposits and the Banking Turmoil of 2023 (clevelandfed.org)

Bank Franchise as a Stabilizing Force

Banks derive a franchise value from regulatory restrictions on entry and competition and from the government-sponsored safety net that includes deposit insurance and access to the Federal Reserve discount window. They also grow franchise value through customer relationships, that to some degree provide a stable borrower or depositor base through the special value they generate. The article explores how bank franchise value can serve as a stabilizing force during financial turbulence. It argues that banks with higher franchise values are more likely to engage in prudent behavior because they have more to lose in terms of future profitability. They tend to maintain better asset quality, stronger capital positions and more stable funding sources, which makes them more resilient during crises. It also presents empirical evidence showing that banks with higher franchise values experienced fewer deposit withdrawals during periods of market stress.

Bank Franchise as a Stabilizing Force – San Francisco Fed (frbsf.org)

Affordable Housing, Unaffordable Credit? Concentration and High-Cost Lending for Manufactured Homes

Manufactured homes, which are the largest source of unsubsidized affordable housing in the U.S., are seen by policymakers as a means of alleviating housing supply shortages, but this requires that those seeking to purchase a manufactured home will have adequate access to credit. This paper analyzes the market for manufactured home loans, demonstrating that this market is highly concentrated, with lenders charging substantially higher interest rates than for site-built homes. The analysis also finds that loans in counties with higher market concentration carry significantly higher rates and suggests that this relationship is causal. Moreover, “…integrated lenders, which play an outsized role in the market for manufactured home loans, charge particularly high rates, and additional results suggest that these lenders exploit their market power over borrowers.”

Affordable Housing, Unaffordable Credit? Concentration and High-Cost Lending for Manufactured Homes by Sebastian Doerr, Andreas Fuster :: SSRN

An Empirical Analysis of the Cost of Borrowing

This study examines the comparative cost of borrowing using bank loans versus corporate bond issuance for U.S. firms and related issues. The analysis finds significant, within-firm heterogeneity in borrowing costs even after controlling for observable characteristics such as loan size and maturity, and it finds that obtaining a bank loan is generally cheaper than issuing a corporate bond, with an average cost difference of 132 basis points. Moreover, the analysis finds that fluctuations in borrowing costs have persistent negative effects on key firm-level outcomes, such as investment and leverage decisions, with these effects varying across industry sectors.

An Empirical Analysis of the Cost of Borrowing- Working Papers – St.
Louis Fed (stlouisfed.org)

Preventing Foreclosures: What Has Been Done? What Is to Come?

Loss mitigation strategies for distressed residential mortgage loans have evolved significantly over the past 15 years, yielding significant improvement in outcomes. This study documents the “paradigm shifts” in loss mitigation brought about by the 2008 financial crisis and the further refinements implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic, and reviews empirical evidence demonstrating a significant reduction in foreclosure rates resulting from these interventions. The paper proposes potential enhancements to existing programs, including further improvements in streamlined mitigation processes, integration of mortgage reserve accounts and pragmatic customer outreach. The discussion also emphasizes the need for ongoing innovation of loss mitigation tools to better support borrowers facing financial hardships, particularly underserved populations, to further reduce default rates and enhance homeownership stability. 

Preventing Foreclosures (urban.org)

Chart of the Month

Evolution of Stress Capital Buffers in Aggregate and by Bank Category

Based on the 2024 Federal Reserve stress test results, the aggregate of banks’ required capital buffers will increase 40 basis points, from 3.3 to 3.7 percentage points. The increase varies by bank category, with Category I banks (or the GSIBs) projected to see the largest increase of around 50 basis points. Category II-III banks are expected to see the next largest increase of around 40 basis points, while Category IV banks are looking at an increase of about 20 basis points. The increase in SCBs is driven by greater capital depletion caused by reduced projected revenues and increased projected losses under this year’s severely adverse scenario.

Featured BPI Research

A Helpful Federal Reserve Board Statement on Bank Liquidity

Large banks must conduct internal liquidity stress tests (ILSTs) for multiple horizons and report the results to their supervisors. To pass the ILSTs, banks must 1) have enough liquid assets to meet projected liquidity needs and 2) demonstrate that they can monetize the assets (convert the liquid assets into cash). The note discusses a recent FAQ published by the Federal Reserve that states that banks can point to borrowing from the Federal Reserve’s discount window or standing repo facility, or to borrowing from a Federal Home Loan Bank as the means by which they plan to monetize their liquid assets in their ILSTs. The FAQ is consequential in part because banks will now be able to plan to meet a substantial portion of their projected immediate cash needs under stress by planning on borrowing from the Federal Reserve rather than entirely by drawing on deposits maintained at the Fed (reserve balances). The change will also increase the incentive of banks to be prepared to use the discount window or standing repo facility when needed. The post notes that the FAQ leaves many critical questions unanswered.

A Helpful Federal Reserve Board Statement on Bank Liquidity

How Should Banks Manage Climate Transition Risk?

This blog post argues that misalignment of a company’s emission profile with government climate goals does not always lead to increased transition-related credit or legal risks for banks that lend to those companies.  As a result, measuring emissions misalignment with government climate goals does not help quantify transition risk as a driver of credit or legal risk. The post proposes an alternative framework based on company emissions that could be used to help quantify transition-related credit risks but notes that the empirical evidence suggests that transition-related credit risk is relatively small compared to other risks that banks typically face. The post concludes that a bank should manage transition-driven credit risk by separating its efforts to align its financed emissions with climate goals, which is a strategic business decision, from how it manages credit risk impacts from transition risk. To manage transition-related legal risk, a bank should take into account current legal uncertainty by jurisdiction. Regulators should not encourage or require banks to quantify transition risk by measuring the consistency of their credit portfolio with an emission reduction scenario. Regulatory authorities should also be careful not to encourage or require banks to divert risk resources from other, larger risks by overemphasizing transition-related credit risk.

How Should Banks Manage Climate Transition Risk?

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Disclaimer:

The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank Policy Institute’s member banks, and are not intended to be, and should not be construed as, legal advice of any kind.