Originally published by International Banker
It was recently reported that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) had rated a third of large US national banks as having unsatisfactory management. That report raises serious questions—not about the banks and their management but rather about the examination regime administered by the banking agencies and their management.
The OCC report should not have been a surprise, as it was consistent with the most recent “Federal Reserve Supervision and Regulation Report” for May 2024. In that report, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the Fed) found that two-thirds of large US bank holding companies (which in most cases have national bank subsidiaries) were not well managed.
One might have expected these reports to rattle markets. After all, under Federal Reserve guidance, a well-managed firm “has sufficient financial and operational strength and resilience to maintain safe-and-sound operations through a range of conditions, including stressful ones”. Thus, the twin findings by the Fed and the OCC that substantial numbers of large US banks were deficient in that measure should have been a major policy and market concern. But there was no such concern—because any such conclusion is flatly inconsistent with the reported capital, liquidity and earnings of those banks, as well as the clear views of investors and analysts. Indeed, it is even inconsistent with the Fed’s supervision and regulation report itself, which begins by stating, “The banking system remains sound and resilient.”
So, how could the Fed and the OCC reach examination conclusions so dramatically at odds with reality? They did so in two ways: by shifting the focus of their examinations from material financial risk to so-called operational risk, and by changing their roles from examination to management consulting.
It is important to stress that we know that the low management ratings are not being driven by risks such as those that caused the banking upheaval in March 2023—namely, interest rate risk (IRR) and liquidity risk (LR). Those are actually separate components of both agencies’ rating systems and reportedly are satisfactory—not surprisingly, given that large banks weathered that episode well and mid-sized banks have acted over the past year to diminish their interest rate risks and enhance their liquidity.
Perhaps more significantly, agency examiners exhibited no prescience on that front as interest rate risks and liquidity risks were rising: The final composite rating for Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) prior to its failure was satisfactory. The same was true for First Republic Bank and Signature Bank.
So, on what were (and are) agency examiners focused, if not the material financial risks that caused those banks to fail? According to recent news reports, the OCC rates half of large US banks as deficient in how they manage “operational risk”—issues such as information technology (IT), vendor management and cybersecurity—and those low operational risk ratings drove the low ratings for management in general. The Federal Reserve captures operational risk through a “governance and controls” rating that is distinct from its capital and liquidity ratings. Its supervision and regulation report released in November 2022—shortly before SVB’s failure—stated: “While many firms have broadly met expectations in capital planning and liquidity risk management, they still have work to do to meet supervisory expectations for governance and controls. Governance and controls findings represent over 75 percent of the outstanding issues at large financial institutions. Governance and controls findings include deficiencies related to operational resilience, information technology, third-party risk management, and compliance.”
